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I. SCOPE OF ARTICLE
As the early cases at common law defined it, the liability for a
misrepresentation was rather narrow. A plaintiff could succeed only
by alleging and proving a certain limited set of facts which would
entitle him to recover.1
Since that time courts generally, and particularly those in American
jurisdictions, have whittled away at these strict requirements. It is
the purpose of this article to set forth the traditional common law
delineations of liability and to show how these have been expanded.
This expansion will be traced along two lines. The first will deal with
the kind of conduct that gives rise to liability. The second will concern
the problem of duty; i.e., what persons can recover once given action-
able conduct.
II. CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO LIABILITY
A misrepresentation is simply the statement of a fact that is not
true. In selling a car if A states to B that the car will run 20 miles
to the gallon when in fact it will not, A has misrepresented to B.
This gives rise to an ex contractu action. B could sue to rescind the
contract, sue for damages in an action for warranty, or defend in an
action by A for the contract price.
Independent of the contractual situation in which it might have
arisen, a misrepresentation gives rise to a separate cause of action
sounding in tort. As such an independent action it is usually labelled
deceit.2
A's misrepresentation in the foregoing example could have re-
sulted because of one of the following: (1) He intentionally misrepre-
sented the fact as true when he knew it was not. (2) A believed the
misrepresentation to be true but arrived at that belief in a careless
or negligent manner. (3) A used due diligence but still misrepre-
sented the fact. It would then appear that a misrepresentation can
result from conduct of differing kinds. The question that immediately
arises is what kind of conduct must be asserted to succeed in the
tort action? Will a negligent or innocent misrepresentation render a
party liable for the damages that might be caused to others who rely
on the statement?
The English courts decided that only intentional or so called
fraudulent misrepresentations would support the common law action
of deceit. In Deery v. Peek3 the court considered whether a mere
1 Prosser, LAW OF TORTS (Hornbook series) 523 (1955).
2 Ibid. at 521.
3 Deery v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
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negligent misrepresentation would suffice and decided that it would not.
"In an action of deceit it is not enough to establish misrepre-
sentation alone . .. a false statement made through want of
care falls far short of and is a very different thing from
fraud."4
The requirement of intentional misrepresentation and actual knowl-
edge of the falsity, is usually called fraud or scienter. This was the
very gravamen of the action of deceit at common law. 5
As a result of Deery v. Peek, the rule became fixed that only
intentional, fraudulent conduct would give rise to liability in a deceit
action. The possibility of bringing a straight negligence action and
asserting negligent misrepresentation was asserted. Judge Jeremiah
Smith stated that one should be able to succeed in an action for
negligence by alleging a duty on the part of the defendant to use
reasonable care in making representations. 6 Logically it appears to be
true that if one is liable for damages caused by the negligent operation
of an automobile he should also be liable for the damages caused
by the negligent misrepresentation of a fact.7
Only one court has openly recognized negligence as a basis of
liability in the area of misrepresentation. In Cunningham v. Pease8 the
defendant represented that certain blacking could be used on stoves when
in fact it was only to be used on stove pipes. An explosion resulted
causing physical injury to the plaintiff. The court stated:
"In this state a person who acts on a false representation
may recover the damages he sustains in an action of deceit,
when the maker of the statement knew it to be false, and in an
action of negligence when he ought to have known it to be so."9
In Weston v. Brown'0 the rule of the Cunningham case was ex-
tended to cover a situation where the harm caused by the negligent
misrepresentation was to one's economic interests.
"Once granting, however, that damage has resulted from reason-
able reliance on a negligent misstatement it is difficult to per-
ceive why liability should be made to depend upon the nature
of the injury sustained.""
New Hampshire has been the only jurisdiction that avowedly
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.; International Milling v. Priem, 179 Wis. 622, 192 N.W. 68 (1923); 23
Am. JUR., FRAUD AND DECIET, §126 (1939).6 Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARv. L. REv. 184 (1901).
7 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1910);
Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv.
733 (1929) ; Keeton, Anbit of a Fraudlent Representor's Liability, 17 TEx. L.
REV. 1 (1938).
s Cunningham v. Pease, House Furnishing Co. 74 N.H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 (1908).
9 Ibid.




allows a negligence action for false representation. Many jurisdic-
tions continue to label the cause of action deceit but will impose lia-
bility in certain cases where the misrepresentation was merely negli-
gent, not intentional. It is not within the scope of this article to present
a state by state analysis of the law. Our discussion will be limited
to examining in what instances Wisconsin allows deceit to succeed
where only negligence is alleged.12
Ordinarily,13 in the action for deceit, intentional misrepresentation
must be alleged. If, as in New Hampshire, liability is to be imposed
for merely negligent misrepresentation, the proper form of action is
negligence. Negligent conduct will not support a deceit action. There-.
fore, when Wisconsin or any other court speaks of allowing recovery
in deceit when the misrepresentation was due to negligence, they fail
to differentiate the two causes of action. Actually, this is not important
since the causes of action have been abolished. The important thing
is that liability is being imposed for negligent misrepresentation. For
the sake of technical accuracy the action should be labelled negligence
rather than deceit.
At an early period the Wisconsin court allowed recovery in an
action for deceit where the misrepresentation was not fraudulent.
These cases were limited to misrepresentations by a seller of lands
to the buyer in regard to the quantity or quality thereof.14 The rule is
stated in AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE as follows: "In some states a
vendor or transactor of land has been held to strict accountability
for false representation regardless of intent."'15
If our court ever intended to limit the rule to cases involving sales
of lands they quickly expanded it to other contractual situations and
imposed liability where the misrepresentation was not intentional.16
In a case where the defendant induced plaintiff to purchase notes of a
third party by representing that the notes were secured by a first
mortgage when in fact they were not, the court said:
"The action was based on fraud. If Mr. Hackett made the
representations ... and they were false, relied upon by the plain-
tiff, and caused damage, it is immaterial whether they were
made in bad faith or not."' 7
We see from this case that, though the court still talks about
12 See 23 Am. JUR., FRAUI AND DEC=n, §20 (1939) for cases in other jurisdic-
tions holding negligence can be a basis for a cause of action in certain instances.
13Supra, notes 1 and 3.
14 Bird v. Kleiner, 41 Wis. 134, (1876) ; Davis v. Nuzum, 72 Wis. 439, 40 N.W. 497
(1888) ; Gunther v. Ulrich, 82 Wis. 222, 52 N.W. 88 (1892).1523 Am. JuR., FRAUD AND DEcEIT, §120 (1939).
16 Cameron v. Mount, 86 Wis. 477, 56 N.W. 1094 (1893) sale of a horse; Palmer
v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103, 107 N.W. 478 (1906) promissory note; First Na-
tional Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703 (1914).
17 First National Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703 (1914).
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fraud, they obviously do not use it in the sense of meaning that the
misrepresentation must have been intentional. In a later action for
deceit, the court apparently used fraud in the same sense as the Eng-
lish courts but disposed of intent as an element of the action.
"It is of course not necessary in order to establish the defend-
ant's liability to show that the representation was made with the
intent to deceive and defraud plaintiffs."'
Wisconsin appears, in consequence, to have departed from the
common law rule. This is true, whether we say fraud is an element
of deceit but then define fraud to mean something less than an in~en-
tional misrepresentation, or whether we simply dispense with fraud
as a requirement of deceit.2 0 The basis of liability for a misrepre-
sentation need no longer be intentional conduct in Wisconsin. Despite
this obvious departure, Wisconsin has not, like New Hampshire, 2 1
declared that liability will be imposed even where the conduct is not
fraudulent. Instead, in the case of Montreal River Lumber Company
v. Nuhills,22 an effort was made to reconcile the court's position with
that of the English rule. There liability was imposed for a negligent
misrepresentation made in inducing a sale of lumber where defendant
made the representation and stated it to be true as of his own knowl-
edge. The court cited Deery v. Peek2 and used it as authority to
support their decision, saying:
"The falsehood consists in stating that the party knew the facts
when he did not .... 24
In other words, the court is trying to say that the misrepresenta-
tion consisted in the defendant stating that the facts were true as of
his own knowledge when he knew they were not "as of his own knowl-
edge." The representation which the plaintiff relied on to his damage
concerned the quality of the lumber. If this had been of the quality
stated it would be immaterial that the defendant had in fact learned
of it through another, rather than by his own examination and con-
clusion as to its value.
To further clarify this point let us take an example. A states to
B that he personally knows that a car will run 20 miles to a gallon
of gas. In fact A does not know this personally but rather was in-
formed by his employee C who has always been reliable.
There are really two representations here. The one concerns the
source of A's knowledge and the other the gas mileage of the car. The
1s Haentze v. Locker, 233 Wis. 583, 290 N.W. 163 (1940).
10 Supra, note 17.
20 Supra, note 18.
21 Supra, note 8.





first is fraudulent because A knows his information was not person-
ally acquired. The second misrepresentation is only negligently made
because A had every right to believe his usually reliable employee, C.
That is, A honestly believed the car would average 20 miles to a gal-
lon of gas. Even though the first representation was fraudulent, it is
not the one which B relied on. The damage resulted because the car
would not travel 20 miles on a gallon of gas. Therefore, predicating
liability upon a false representation regarding the source of knowl-
edge is poor logic.
Although the reasoning is faulty, the statement of the court in
the Montreal case is indicative of the circumstances under which the
Wisconsin court will allow recovery for a non-intentional misrepre-
sentation. This appears to be true in cases where there is a statement
of a positive fact, not merely an opinion, and declared to be true as of
the speaker's own knowledge.
"It was sufficient that he made a positive statement of facts
and did not state it as being made on information. ' '25
The following conclusions on the state of the law in Wisconsin
can be drawn: The court will allow recovery in an action of deceit
based on a non-intentional representation, when the statement is of a
positive existing fact declared true as of the speaker's own knowledge
and made in the course of a contractual negotiation.
Two recent cases in Wisconsin indicate that in the future the court
may retreat somewhat from the doctrine they had established which
enforced liability for non-fraudulent misrepresentation.
In Benz v. Zobel,26 the court criticized the statement in the
Haentze2 case as being too broad and recommended that put forth
in the International Milling Company.28 The latter case unequivocally
adopted the majority requirement of intentional misrepresentation.
In the Benz case there was a compromise settlement of a previous
contract. It was alleged that the defendant falsely stated that if
plaintiff did not settle he would lose all his rights under the contract.
After criticizing the Haentze case, the court, however, based its de-
cision not on a question of fraud, but on the point that plaintiff had
no right to rely on these representations.
"This is clearly a matter of opinion as to the legal effect of plain-
tiff's failure to sign. It is not a statement of fact. ' 29
Although the Court's reference to the element of scienter was dicta,
and although the fact situation was different from the previous cases,
this decision indicates a more stringent attitude on the part of the
25 Supra, note 17.
26 Benz v. Zobel, 255 Wis. 542, 39 N.W.2d 713 (1949).
27 Supra, note 18.
2S International Milling Co. v. Priem, 179 Wis. 622, 192 N.W. 68 (1923).
29 Supra, note 26 at 557.
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Court. This opinion is confirmed by another recent case3" involving
the sale of dairy cows. Here the defendant represented them as healthy
and free from brucellosis. The court cited International Milling Co.
v. Prihm31 as the majority law, however, the case was not particularly
strong on the question of fraud because it could have turned upon the
fact that plaintiff had no right to rely on the statement without having
a medical test made.
These two most recent decisions, 2 clearly indicate that our Court
is retreating from its liberal extension of liability and returning to the
common law requirement of fraud. However, in a case where the
representation is of an existing fact, made as of the speaker's own
knowledge and in the course of contractual negotiation, the Court
cannot insist upon intentional misrepresentation. To do so, the Court
would have to overrule prior Wisconsin decisions that did not require
intent.
III. To WHOMi IS A DUTY OWED?
Whether a particular court holds that a misrepresentation must be
fraudulent or only negligent to impose liability there is still the problem
of to whom a duty is owed not to misrepresent. Is it limited to the
party to whom the misrepresentation is directly made or does it also
embrace third parties?
The English case of Peek v. Gurney3 3 limited liability to the person
or persons whom the defendant desired to influence. In that case
plaintiff filed a bill in equity asking damages for a misrepresentation.
A prospectus had been issued by the defendant which contained a
fradulent misrepresentation. The court held that this prospectus was
made to influence only persons who bought stock directly from the
corporation. Therefore, there was no liability to the plaintiffs who had
bought on the open market, even though in fact they may have been
induced to do so by the prospectus. The English view tends to restrict
the number of persons to whom a misrepresentor is liable. This
restriction coupled with the requirement that the false representation
be fraudulently made, results in a very narrow range of liability.
We have seen how the requirement of fraudulent conduct has to
some extent been done away with. But much more definitely has
liability been extended by allowing others than the person whom
defendant "desired" to influence to recover. It is now well settled
that an intentional misrepresentor is liable to all those persons whom
he should reasonably anticipate would rely on his representation. 34
3o Larson v. Splett, 267 Wis. 473, 66 N.W.2d 180 (1954).
31 Supra, note 28.
32 Supra, note 26 and 30.
33 Peek v. Gurney, 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 377 (1873).
34 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); New York
Title & Mortgagee Co. v. Hutton, 63 App. D.C. 266, 71 F.2d 989 (1934).
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This means that where A makes a misrepresentation intending
only to influence B but should reasonably expect under the circum-
stances that C and D also would rely on the representation, A will
be liable also to C and D. !\'lost often the circumstances which give
rise to the "reasonable expectation" are that the misrepresentation
is embodied in a written document customarily relied on by persons
other than the party the defendant immediately wanted to influence.
In the Ultramares case 35 the misrepresentation was in the form of a
certified balance sheet and the court held that if made fraudulently
the defendant was liable to all persons who might reasonably rely on
that balance sheet such as investors or creditors. The plaintiff, who
had extended credit on the faith of the balance sheet was held to be
entitled to damages if the sheet was fradulently made.
Although one who fraudulently misrepresents is liable to all persons
who would reasonably be expected to rely on his statement, this is not
the rule where the misrepresentation is merely negligent. In the case
of Peterson v. Gales36 an abstractor was employed by the seller of
property and due to a negligent oversight on his part, omitted a re-
strictive covenant from the abstract which resulted in damage to the
purchasers. The court stated:
"By the great if not universal authority the liability of an ab-
stractor for damages resulting from his mistakes is based on
contract and does not rest upon principles of negligence. He,
therefore, is not liable to persons who may be misled to their
damage by reason of his negligence unless some privity of con-
tract exist between them."37
In this case we have a negligent misrepresentation but not one
made under the limited set of circumstances in which we have dis-
covered Wisconsin will impose liability; i.e., it was not made in the
course of contractual negotiations and made true as of the speaker's
own knowledge. The statement of the court here indicates there is a
contract liability to persons in privity, but no tort duty to persons
such as the plaintiff who reasonably relied on the abstract. The re-
mainder of this article will be devoted to distinguishing the liability
in tort and in contract respectively in the area of misrepresentation.
In addition we will trace the recent trends towards a wider tort duty.
A cause of action in a court of law exists when a plaintiff asserts
a right, a duty corresponding to that right on the part of the defend-
ant, and a breach thereof.
35 Ibid.; other cases involving misrepresentations embodied in a document are
National Bank of Savannah v. Kershaw Oil Mill, 202 F. 90 (1912); Stickel v.
Atwood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 Atl. 687 (1903).




"The existence of a legal right and of a legal duty corresponding
to that right are the essential elements of a cause of action.' '2 s
The difference between liability in contract and liability in tort is
in the origin of these rights and duties; i.e., how they arise. If a duty
to act or not to act in a certain manner is imposed by operation of law
we say the cause of action lies in tort. If, on the other hand, the duty
is voluntarily assumed by the consent of the parties it is a contract
action. This distinction can best be demonstrated by examining one
of the three landmark cases that trace the extension of tort liability
in the field of misrepresentation. Prior to the case of MacPherson v.
Buick,"9 it had been held that no cause of action in tort could arise
from the breach of a duty existing solely by virtue of contract unless
there was between the defendant and the injured party what is termed
privity of contract.4 0 In the MacPherson case the defendant, a manu-
facturer of automobiles, was sued in an action to recover for personal
injuries, not misrepresentation. The plaintiff, a retailer, was injured
because of the negligent construction of the vehicle. Under the state
of the law at the time,4' the defendant's duty to manufacture arose
only because of his contract with the wholesaler, hence it was only
towards him that he would be liable for breach of contract and not
in tort. The court held that where the instrument is such that a reason-
able man would understand that if negligently constructed it was
reasonably certain to cause injury to person or property, then there
is a duty owed not only to the party in privity but to all who might
be injured by such negligence. The result was to find that there were
enforceable duties arising out of both the rules of contract and tort.
Contract duties arise through the consent of the parties and the
interest they protect is that of having the contractual promises per-
formed. 2 In the MacPherson case the wholesaler contracted to have
the defendant manufacture a car for him. Once agreeing to do so,
the defendant owed a duty to the wholesaler to construct the car
in a non-negligent manner. Since this duty was a contract duty
voluntarily assumed it was owed to no other than the wholesaler who
was in privity of contract with the defendant. No duty was owed to
plaintiff and he could not have recovered in contract because the
essential elements (a right and duty) of a cause of action were missing.
Tort duties are not created by contract but are imposed by law.43
The basic distinction then between tort and contract liability is that
in tort the right and duty necessary for a cause of action arises by
38 52 AM. JUR., TORTS, §10 (1939).
a Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
40 38 Am. JUR., NEGLIGENCE, §21 (1939).
41 Ibid.




operation of law, whereas in contract they exist by virtue of the vol-
untary consent of the parties, and exist only between the parties.44
We know how duties arise by consent, but what does "imposed by
law" mean? Essentially, it simply means that a court of law sees fit
to recognize a duty and will enforce liability for a breach thereof.
Courts are constantly, recognizing new duties and disregarding
others although the transition is gradual. The law today is a very
different thing from what it was yesterday or will be tomorrow.
"Hardly a rule of today but may be matched by its opposite of yes-
terday."45
What prompts the courts to extend or restrict liability in a given
area depends on public policy, not logic.46
"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience
• . . the felt necessities of the times . . . intuitions of public
policy (determine) the rules by which men shall be governed."4 7
Therefore, we can say that in order to successfully maintain a tort
action a plaintiff must assert a duty on the part of the defendant
towards the plaintiff which duty the court will recognize. Prior to
the MacPherson case, the court refused to impose any duty on parties
in the position of the defendant. However, due to some "intuition of
public policy" felt by the court, it was there held that a duty would
be recognized and liability imposed upon a manufacturer of instru-
ments dangerous to person or property if negligently manufactured.
Thus, where a duty to perform some act (there to manufacture
a car) arises through a contract, the court will now extend liability
in tort for negligent performance to persons not in privity of contract.
But, the rule was limited to negligent acts causing harm to person or
porperty; i.e., physical harm.
The next important case, Glanzer v. Shepard,4 8 took the step of ex-
tending liability to persons not in privity even though the harm caused
was intangible that is to say economic, not physical. Here the plain-
tiff bought of one Bech certain beans and agreed to pay on the basis
of weight as certified by public weighers. Bech contracted with the
defendant to do the weighing. Relying on the weights represented
by the defendant, plaintiff paid Bech. It was discovered that the de-
fendant had erred and the plaintiff brought an action against the de-
fendant weighers for negligent weighing of the beans. The defense
was that the defendant contracted only with Bech and therefore owed
44 Morgan, THE STUDY OF LAW, p. 52 (1948).
45 Cardozo, THE THEORY AND NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, p. 26 (1921).4 0 Andrews, J., in a dissent to Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99 (1928).
47 Holmes, THE COMMON LAW, p. 1 (1881).
48 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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a duty only to him. No duty was owed to the plaintiff to exercise
reasonable care since there was no privity of contract between them.
The court realized the close analogy here to the MacPherson case
and citing it said:
"In such circumstances assumption of the task of weighing was
the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of
all whose conduct was to be governed. We need not state the
duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of con-
tract it (the duty) has an origin not exclusively contractual.
Given the contract and the relation the duty is imposed by
Thus we see that the court is here recognizing a tort duty on the
part of the weigher not to be negligent in performing his contracted
task. This tort duty is owed to the third party, plaintiff, as well as
to Bech who was in privity.
As a result of this case the New York court had reached a point
where tort liability for negligent performance of a task, the obligation
of such performance arising out of contract, was extended to parties
not in privity to the contract. It is imposed even though the harm
resulting from this negligence was not of a physical nature. It goes
one step further than MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
The action was one for negligent weighing of the beans, not for a
negligent misrepresentation of their weight. However, the stage seemed
set for the court to take the final step in a misrepresentation action and
to declare both that negligence is a basis for misrepresentation and
that liability will be extended to third parties for this misrepresenta-
tion. The trend set up by the MacPherson and Glanzer cases was
toward extension of liability. But when a misrepresentation case came
up the court failed to take the last step. Instead they definitely halted
the trend and limited the possibilities in the Glanzer case.
In Ultramares v. Touche,50 the defendants were certified public
accountants employed by Stern & Co. to audit its books and make
out a balance sheet. Stern had manipulated his books but the defend-
ants failed to detect this and consequently their sheet showed Stern
had a net worth of over a million dollars while in reality he was in-
solvent. Stern used this balance sheet to induce creditors to loan him
money. Stern was insolvent and the plaintiff, a creditor who relied
on the balance sheets, sued the defendant auditors on two counts;
one for negligence and one for intentional misrepresentation.
The court carefully considered the allegations but after finding
negligence declared that there was no duty to third parties not to be
negligent.
4 Ibid.50Ultramares Corp. v. Touche et al., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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"The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by
law (hence a liability in tort) to make their certificate without
fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make it with the
care and caution proper to this calling. . . . To creditors and
investors (third parties not in privity of contract) to whom
the employer exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed a
like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in
the circumstances of its making that the employer did not in-
tend to keep it to himself. . . . A different question develops
when we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it
without negligence." 51
The court distinguished the Glanzer case by saying that transfer-
ence of the certificate was the "end and aim of the transaction" while
here such transmission was only one possibility among' many.
This distinction is not convincing. If it were the "end and aim
of the transaction" the court would have decided the Glanzer case
on the third party beneficiary contract theory 2 but rather it was de-
cided by recognizing a tort duty. The court had to rely on such weak
reasoning because, when confronted with the facts of the Ultramares
case, they did not like the way the trend set up in previous decisions
would logically take them. If liability were enforced against third
parties for a negligent misrepresentation, it might put many ac-
countants, abstractors and even lawyers in too difficult a position. The
public good seemed to demand that such a great burden not be im-
posed. The court said:
"If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these
terms are so extreme as to kindle doubt whether a flaw may not
exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these conse-
quences.''
53
From the decision in this case it seems that the Glanzer case must
be restricted to its facts. Also it marks the end of any serious attempt
in the American courts to extend liability for a negligent misrepre-
sentation to third parties not in privity of contract.5 4
IV. SUMMARY
In summary of the law of misrepresentation, we can say that, at
common law, liability would be imposed only for an intentional mis-
representation. 5 In this area of the conduct giving rise to liability,
51 Ibid.52Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
5 Supra, note 50.
54 Supra, note 1 at 544.
55 Supra, notes 1 and 3.56 Supra, notes 14, 16 and 18.
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Wisconsin 56 and other jurisdictions 57 have developed minor extensions
of liability by allowing a tort action like deceit to succeed where no
fraudulent misrepresentation is established but have limited these to
very restricted sets of circumstances. When the issue of negligent
conduct outside of these certain circumstances is before the courts
they have refused to impose liability.58
Likewise at common law the party who could bring an action for
fraudulent misrepresentation had to be the person that the defendant
desired to influence. 59 Generally this rule has been relaxed and now
if the representation is fraudulent anyone in the class whom de-
fendant might reasonably have expected to rely on the misrepresenta-
tion can bring action for his damages. 60
Finally we discussed, by examining three style cases, how the
trend toward a wide extension of liability in tort developed61 and
then was halted by the Ultramares case.6 2 This trend was interpreted
in terms of the policy grounds which move a court to impose tort
duty.
DONALD GANCER
5 Supra, note 12.
58 Supra, notes 36 and 50.
59 Supra, note 33.
60 Supra, notes 34 and 45.
61 Supra, notes 39 and 48.
62 Supra, note 50.
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